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Director of Central Intelligence

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

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Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA–MOZAMBIQUE:

Cooperation and Coercion

Pretoria and Maputo are increasing contacts on a broad range of security and economic issues as pragmatic interests overshadow deep-seated differences. Pretoria continues to combine military pressure and economic benefits to induce Maputo to restrain the African National Congress. Maputo has largely satisfied Pretoria's security concerns for now, but mutual distrust almost certainly will complicate further improvements in relations.

[redacted] (b)(3)

A recently revitalized liaison commission—first established under a 1984 nonaggression pact to discuss security and other issues—met last month for only the second time after a two-year hiatus. Lower level bilateral contacts through the South African trade office in Maputo have recently increased sharply, and joint working groups have been established on specific economic issues. [redacted] (b)(3)

Pretoria's Military Pressure . . .

South African security officials are satisfied with Maputo's efforts to keep a tight rein on the ANC [redacted] They are unhappy, however, with Maputo's anti–South African rhetoric and believe constant pressure is needed to make sure President Chissano continues to restrict ANC activity in Mozambique. Pretoria frequently warns Maputo to clamp down on the ANC and occasionally takes direct action against suspected ANC targets, such as the attack last May on four presumed ANC residences in Maputo [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)

South Africa provides modest, but important, support to RENAMO insurgents—albeit at lower levels than before the 1984 pact. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

South African military officials also see RENAMO as a cost-effective means of perpetuating Pretoria's dominance by disrupting the regional transportation routes that run through Mozambique. [redacted] (b)(3)

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. . . and Economic Rewards

The South African Foreign Ministry is rewarding Maputo by promoting modest economic assistance programs that also reinforce South African leverage and increase Mozambican dependence. Pretoria is giving Maputo a $3 million low-interest loan and technical assistance to improve the port at Maputo—the closest harbor to South Africa's industrial heartland—providing food aid, and negotiating a new work permit system for the more than 70,000 Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa who pump critical foreign currency into Maputo's economy.

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RENAMO attacks on economic targets in Mozambique has complicated Pretoria's dual-track approach. South African repair crews recently rebuilt a bridge destroyed by RENAMO on the railroad from South Africa to Maputo that had delayed export of thousands of tons of South African goods. RENAMO is the major stumblingblock to reopening the Cabora Bassa Hydroelectric Complex in northern Mozambique, and Pretoria has agreed to provide logistic support to a Mozambican battalion that will guard repair crews working on the rehabilitation of the transmission pylons

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Response From Maputo

Chissano appears resigned to at least some cooperation with Pretoria to try to discourage South African support for RENAMO and to enlist desperately needed help in reviving the Mozambican economy. He has pragmatically expanded channels of communication, refused to impose economic sanctions, and reduced some of the harsh rhetoric.

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Outlook

Debate probably will intensify between South African military and Foreign Ministry officials over which track should be emphasized. Chissano's apparent willingness to cooperate may give added leverage to officials who favor playing down aid to RENAMO, but Pretoria's policy will depend primarily on Maputo's ability to cooperate on South African terms. Maputo's conviction that Pretoria provides significant support to RENAMO as well as Chissano's need to maintain his standing in black Africa ensure that some anti-South African rhetoric and contacts with ANC officials will continue.

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

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